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After its emergence from the Soviet collapse, the new Russia grappled with the complex issue of developing a national identity that could embrace the radical contradictions of Russiaâs past and foster integration with the West while maintaining Russian distinctiveness.
The Ukraine War has significantly changed public attitudes toward this question, and led to a consolidation of most of the Russian population behind a set of national ideas. This has contributed to the resilience that Russia has shown in the war, and helped to frustrate Western hopes that economic pressure and heavy casualties would undermine support for the war and for President Vladimir Putin. To judge by the evidence to date, there is very little hope of these Western goals being achieved in the future.
The first post-Soviet president, Boris Yeltsin, sought a radical break with communism and based his rule on the negation of his countryâs â and his own â past, leaving Russia with a profound sense of negative identity. Vladimir Putin, upon assuming office, presented a more positive vision centered on integration with the West (albeit on Russian terms and predicated on retaining Russian independence), but it foundered in the face of irreconcilable differences between Russia and the West.
The state has since struggled to articulate a coherent conception of identity that would define Russiaâs distinctiveness. Only World War II emerged as a potential unifier, with the majority of Russians expressing their pride in Russiaâs role in it, and it acquired an almost religious reverence within the leadershipâs narrative.
Apart from pride in the âGreat Patriotic Warâ (as World War II is known in Russia), the overall public response to identity construction was for a long time lukewarm. When the war in Ukraine started, without any warning to the Russian public, it was initially met with disbelief, confusion, and bewilderment. Most were concerned with their chances to navigate the troubled waters rather than providing support for their country.
No longer. Nearly four years of war has profoundly transformed Russia. Fostered by state propaganda, many ordinary Russians have developed a sense of pride that Russia has survived in the face of Western hostility. This feeling has been fed by Western expressions of contempt toward the Russian people and Russian culture â insults that are assiduously quoted by the state-controlled Russian media. The Russian public struggles to see how the situation can be viewed from the other side and acknowledge that Western concerns may have grounds behind them; for example, the Kremlinâs attempts at meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections better explain the negative attitudes toward Russia in Washington, rather than pre-existing cultural prejudices.
For some time now, patriotism has appeared to be ascendant: recruitment progresses steadily, men are willing to serve (admittedly in return for extremely high wages), and the âHelp the Armyâ movement by women and pensioners shows no sign of abating. Speaking against the tide is considered socially unacceptable as well as dangerous.
Even though it was Russia that invaded Ukraine and that continues to attack the formerly âbrotherly nationâ, many in Russia view the war as defensive in nature and inevitable. A perception of external threat united much of the nation, and anti-Westernism became pervasive. Many Russians have become convinced that the West means Russia no good and, given an opportunity, would seek to inflict harm, unless it is strong enough to protect itself.
The state, which has a responsibility to protect, should be supported â paradoxically even when, as exemplified by the Kursk incursion, it has failed to do so. Accounts of civilians who were trapped for seven months under Ukrainian occupation brought the realities of war home to many Russians, while attacks on the Russian territory, which resulted, according to the official figures, in 621 civilian deaths, instilled a sense of insecurity in European Russia. Trumpâs arrival marked a departure from hostility towards the U.S., but the prevailing attitude toward his peace initiatives is skepticism.
This new sense of national identity is not only rooted in the war. It also stems from economic dynamism. The Russian economy, the most heavily sanctioned globally, experienced sustained growth for three consecutive years. Despite inflation, there is a widespread mood of optimism about the future. The war has stimulated innovation. State and private manufacturers drive technological advancement, similar to what occurred during World War II when Katyusha rockets and T-34 tanks were created. While not all inventions may be groundbreaking, they are numerous and heavily publicized.
The Russian development model constitutes another key identity pillar. Large state obligations, public investment, affordable utilities, and low taxes are the customary norms that Russian citizens anticipate and that form the components of the social contract between them and the state. They believe that their counterparts in the West are disadvantaged in this regard. (...)
Russia will formally withdraw from Europeâs convention for the prevention of torture, a move some rights advocates say is largely symbolic given the countryâs already worsening human rights record.
Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on Saturday proposing that President Vladimir Putin submit the withdrawal to the State Duma, Russiaâs lower house of parliament. The decree was first made public on Monday evening.
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted in 1987, allows inspections of detention facilities across member states. Russia ratified the treaty in 1998, two years after joining the Council of Europe, which promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Russia quit the Council of Europe in March 2022 after being suspended over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Later that year, it also withdrew from the European Convention on Human Rights, ending its obligation to recognize rulings from the European Court of Human Rights.
Russia remains a party to the UN Convention Against Torture, which it ratified in 1985.
The rights group Crew Against Torture warned the withdrawal could worsen conditions in Russian prisons. It noted that during Russiaâs 27 years in the convention, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture made 30 visits and drafted 27 reports â only four of which Moscow agreed to publish.
The NGO said the convention helped ease overcrowding, improve conditions in penal colonies and secure better protections for some inmates.
âRussiaâs withdrawal... marks the final dismantling of the European human rights monitoring system in the country. The decision deprives prisoners of the last formal international protections and paves the way for further declines in human rights conditions,â the group said on Telegram.
No date has been set for Russiaâs formal exit from the treaty.
Interview: Richard Sakwa on Russia Since Perestroika Natalyie Baldwin asks the British author about the Soviet collapse, the 1990s, Vladimir Putinâs governance, the rise of a new cold war and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
